The State of Utah v. Louis M. Clark : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
The State of Utah v. Louis M. Clark : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Booker; Booker and Associates.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Kent Morgan; Deputy District
Attorney; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Clark, No. 950035 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6397
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0. 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee. 
vs. 
LOUIS M. CLARK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, on 
an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence, with 
priority number three, under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
29(b). 
Robert L. Booker 
BOOKER 8c ASSOCIATES 
Associated Plaza, Suite 550 
3 49 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3044 
Telecopier: (801) 521-0664 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan C. Graham 
Attorney General's Office 
Criminal Appeals Division 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Kent Morgan 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellate Case No. 950035-CA 
FILED 
0 E c
- 5 89j 
C0U
«T0FAPPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee. 
vs. 
LOUIS M. CLARK, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
I APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
1 Appellate Case No. 950035-CA 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, on 
an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence, with 
priority number three, under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
29(b). 
Robert L. Booker 
BOOKER & ASSOCIATES 
Associated Plaza, Suite 550 
349 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3044 
Telecopier: (801) 521-0664 
Kenneth A. Bronston 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan C. Graham 
Attorney General's Office 
Criminal Appeals Division 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
Kent Morgan 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned certifies that all parties to the litigation 
involved in the case are revealed by the caption on the front 
cover of this Brief. In addition, the undersigned certifies that 
the following attorneys are now or have represented an interested 
party in this litigation. 
Barbara J. Byrne 
Assistant District Attorney 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Edward K. Brass 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5u\ day of December, 1995. 
AIL 
Robert L. Booker 
Attorney for Appellant 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION ' 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES....3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL 
BECAUSE RULE 22(e) EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT AN ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE MAY BE CORRECTED AT ANY TIME 8 
A. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF RULE 22(e) PERMITS APPELLANT TO 
RAISE HIS ISSUE ON APPEAL 8 
B. THE CASES CITED BY THE STATE EITHER DO NOT APPLY OR ARE 
EASILY DISTINGUISHED 11 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SENTENCED 
CLARK TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BASED UPON CLARK'S REFUSAL TO 
COOPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATING LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITIES .' 14 
A. THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT THE SENTENCING COURT WAS ONLY 
CONCERNED WITH OBTAINING "BACKGROUND INFORMATION" 
COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE RECORD 14 
B. APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO BEING COMPELLED TO GIVE 
TESTIMONY AND ASSIST FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS WAS CLEARLY 
AND SPECIFICALLY RAISED 16 
CONCLUSION 20 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 21 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Roberts v. United States. 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1363 
(1980) 18 
State v. Brooks. 230 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 37 (1994) 2,9,11,13 
State v. Galleaos. 84 P.2d 586, 591 (Utah App. 1993).2,9,10,11,13 
Ullmann v. United States. 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956) 20 
United States v. Manduiano. 425 U.S. 564, 575 (1976) 20 
STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment 3,8,14 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12 3,8,14 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e) 2,4,8,9,11 
iv 
JURISDICTION' 
This is an appeal from the Final Order denying Defendant's 
Korir-i r-- ^rre'^ Sentence rendered against Appellant, in the 
T 
before the Honourable r.enneih Rigtiup. The uT.-J:I Cuui : o; Appeals 
has jurisdiction i n thi s matter pursuant to Title 78, Section 2a-
3 1 Jtal I Code Ai n :i , ] 9 53 as ai nei ided. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Louis Clark to consecutive sentences because Clark raised his 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and refused to 
cooperate with law enforcement authorities? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In the standard of review for "plain error" there are two 
requirements to determine whether plain error has occurred. The 
first requirement is that it should have been obvious to a trial 
court that it was committing error. ...The second and somewhat 
interrelated requirement is that the error affect the substantial 
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. The 
standard of review for addressing the illegal sentencing issue for 
the first time under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), 
provides that the court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. However, this 
rule has been interpreted as granting continuing jurisdiction to 
the trial court to correct an illegally imposed sentence. State 
v. Galleaos, 849 P.2d 586, 591-92 (Utah App. 1993) Therefore, the 
trial court is the proper forum to first challenge the imposition 
of allegedly illegal sentences. State v. Brooks, 230 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 33, 37 (1994). The standard for whether the assertion of 
fifth amendment right is proper is based upon the recognition, 
federal statutes conferring immunity on witnesses in federal 
judicial proceedings, including grand jury investigations, are so 
2 
familiar that they have become part of our "constitutional 
fabi' 11 ri Supi d , ,-ii 4 '-" 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. AND RULES 
"No person shal] be held to answer lev a capital . cr 
otherwise infamous crime, unlecr. "ir" •- presentment or »nd • ct-ment .,1 
a Gran, ...... ry? except "in < -_ _. „-.± ... . 
or 1:: the Milit^o. w!:--r in actual service : r- • ..rae or War or public 
d.^pc7^; ; l-' •rr,-T be subject for "K:° same offence to be 
twice JJL. jeopara\ ; iii.p or limb- nor . . . be 
compelled ••. .-'<: ririnal case to be a w.i:ness against himself. 
n ! -->•-: *' '• •--. rr ~r-* - - i * - >ui due process 
of la'w; nor sha^i p i . vuce property ~i- Lui,.;i •. .
 K .;. :.ir use, 
without just compensation.'' U.S. CONST, amend. V, 
appear and defenc :u person and by counsel, •: =; aema^u the n a i u U 
and cause of the accusation against him. r\- have a copy thereof, 
to testify :i i i 1 :i :i s o w i 1 bel la ] f tc 1: e :: :>i ifr :>i: ite :I hy tl i = i r:i tnesses 
against him, to have compulsory pi: ocess to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy pub] i c trial by 
ai l :i i i: tpar t:::i e ] ji i:i : y of tl: I = cc: i n i t ^ c :i : d :l St.] : :i ::t: :i i I \ j 1: :i :i cl I tl i B offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the r i ght to appeal in all 
cases, In no instance shall any accused, person, before final 
judgmei it, be coi i: ipe.,1 ] ed to ad vai ice n toi ie;;y oi : £e es to si 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
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testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, 
Utah Const.. Art. I, § 12. 
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." U.R.Cr.P. 22(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This is an appeal from Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence 
which was filed on October 12, 1994. An Order denying the Motion 
to Correct Sentence was signed by Judge Rigtrup on December 16, 
1994, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Appellant, Louis Malcolm Clark ("Clark"), was originally 
charged with three counts of falsely signing a financial 
transaction card/sales slip, all second degree felonies. After a 
two-day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18, 1992, one count 
was dismissed upon the State's motion, but Clark was convicted on 
the remaining two counts. Three separate sentencing hearings were 
conducted on the matter, and constitutes the evidence for purposes 
of both the Motion to Correct the Sentence and the instant Appeal. 
At the first sentencing hearing held on January 4, 1993, the Trial 
Court stated that Clark had failed to disclose information related 
to his background and family, and failed to cooperate with the 
Adult Probation and Parole Department ("AP&P") concerning his 
presentence report. Post-Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings 
("Hra. 1"), at 245. The State recommended that Clark go to prison 
and serve consecutive sentences because the State claimed that it 
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could not determine whether any prior crimes had been committed by 
AppeJ 1 : * .^ _ L trie c'r-^  • i:-' ." ; Uit; First 
Sentencing Hearing, ;,., T u a l Court u.ie^Lta . ,ark to provide a 
description of -he ci me and some collateral contacts to the AP&P. 
Id., Li • . . - . . • : 
Febi uary 22, 19 93, 
No one from AP&P i nterviewec wi t^w.. :f~ erupted .rituct 
the Appel 1 ant, as 1 lad I: sei I d :ii sens 
Hearing, At the Secoi id Sentencing Healing, a Sciii La^e county 
Assistant District Attorney stated that, f-^ r .aw pnfo^cp^ent 
pur poses, tl le State des 11 i-..J I hut • .-
and other similar cases, interview Clark rather than .nP&P. Post-
Tria 1 Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. ?"' 
Coun..> . i_:
 v;a. - oegan t«" . . .- t 
only AP&P needed morf information relating t-_- Defendant's 
b " v ^ 'u:.: wnen he was lnter^rr^5. x • hr- Tri :1 Couir 
TUe Court stated " " ._ .i._i"::..,.ion wm , . :..n.:il 
to law1 enforcement and important enough that 1 could consider the 
1- • ^ --r ^ —• * r ^ nee 
R e p c deiiae:... .ff _. • ^ n u o ^ ~ ^ u ^ .-_ ..scstant 
District Attorney- wa:: told t cei.A i—% enforcement officers t ". le 
prison M> in-1*' A| >pe.l 11 nil ; mid III^ MD report in I In* ( miri whether he 
had cooperated, If i.t; was reported that Ciai k did not cooperate, 
the Trial Court Indicated that it would impose consecutive 
sentericfj\\ \ d «11 ,(• 1 /' I 11 i i (:l r\ent p n ( i 11ri I"io<i i i 11< | wvi<-; «••;pt f <v? 
March 22, 19 93. 
At the Third Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Court again began 
by claiming that Clark had provided AP&P with little information 
to prepare a report. The Court then shifted its focus, however, 
and stated that it was inclined to run the sentences consecutively 
unless Clark cooperated with law enforcement and gave them a full 
disclosure concerning other crimes in which Clark may have been 
involved, and identified co-conspirators. (Emphasis added.) Post-
Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. 3"), at 265. 
Counsel for Clark pointed out that at the conclusion of the trial, 
the Court had suggested that it would accept the recommendation in 
the Presentence Report prepared for Judge Hanson's case, and would 
likely impose a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence 
imposed by Judge Hanson. Hra. 3 at 266. 
Counsel also pointed out that at the second hearing, there 
had been a turn of events, in which the Trial Court wanted Clark 
to cooperate law enforcement officials rather than be interviewed 
by AP&P for additional background information. j£. at 267. 
Counsel for Appellant acknowledged that the Trial Court had 
an interest in certain background information, but forcing Clark 
to become involved in this investigation, through possibly self-
incriminating statements to federal investigators, was a violation 
of his constitutional rights. J£. at 272. The Court stated that 
it recognized Clark had a right to remain silent, and that he not 
incriminate himself without a grant of immunity from law 
enforcement agencies. The Court also acknowledged that no such 
immunity had been offered to Clark; and that the Court could not 
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legitimately force Clark to do anything. However, the Court then 
stated, "it is clear that he didn't give any useful information to 
AP & P. When he appeared before me, the prosecutor made the 
request that he cooperate with the law enforcement officers. 
That's the point in which the Court made it clear that seemed to 
be appropriate." XfiL- at 273. 
Thereafter, the Trial Court imposed a consecutive sentence 
because, as the Court stated, "there is no indication in Judge 
Hanson's report, as well as mine, that there was any cooperation 
with law enforcement officers to explain these as well as other 
crimes." Id. at 277. (Emphasis added). The Trial Court stated 
that given the lack of cooperation, the Court was justified in 
sentencing Clark to 1 to 15 year sentences on both counts. The 
Trial Court ran the sentences consecutive to each other, plus 
consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Hanson in another 
case. l£l. at 278. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court violated Clark's constitutional rights when 
it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences, based 
upon the fact that Clark would not divulge information to federal 
law enforcement officials relating to the crimes with which he was 
charged, or other similar crimes that occurred in Utah. Due 
process applies in post-trial, as well as, trial proceedings. 
Clark raised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination during the sentencing phase of his trial once it was 
revealed that the Trial Court no longer wanted Clark to provide 
7 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Const.. Art. I, § 12. 
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." U.R.Cr.P. 22(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This is an appeal from Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence 
which was filed on October 12, 1994. An Order denying the Motion 
to Correct Sentence was signed by Judge Rigtrup on December 16, 
1994, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
Appellant, Louis Malcolm Clark ("Clark"), was originally 
charged with three counts of falsely signing a financial 
transaction card/sales slip, all second degree felonies. After a 
two-day jury trial, held on November 17 and 18, 1992, one count 
was dismissed upon the State's motion, but Clark was convicted on 
the remaining two counts. Three separate sentencing hearings were 
conducted on the matter, and constitutes the evidence for purposes 
of both the Motion to Correct the Sentence and the instant Appeal. 
At the first sentencing hearing held on January 4, 1993, the Trial 
Court stated that Clark had failed to disclose information related 
to his background and family, and failed to cooperate with the 
Adult Probation and Parole Department ("AP&P") concerning his 
presentence report. Post-Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings 
("Hra. 1"), at 245. The State recommended that Clark go to prison 
and serve consecutive sentences because the State claimed that it 
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could not determine whether any prior crimes had been committed by 
Appellant. Hra. 1 at 243. At the conclusion of the First 
Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Court directed Clark to provide a 
description of the crime and some collateral contacts to the AP&P. 
Id. at 253, 254. Thereafter, a second hearing was set for 
February 22, 1993. 
No one from AP&P interviewed, or even attempted to contact 
the Appellant, as had been discussed during the First Sentencing 
Hearing. At the Second Sentencing Hearing, a Salt Lake County 
Assistant District Attorney stated that, for law enforcement 
purposes, the State desired that detectives involved in the case, 
and other similar cases, interview Clark rather than AP&P. Post-
Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. 2"), at 260. 
Counsel for Clark began to state that it was his inclination that 
only AP&P needed more information relating to Defendant's 
background when he was interrupted by the Trial Court. 
The Court stated "...I think the information would be helpful 
to law enforcement and important enough that I could consider the 
less severe sentence. It is not really the Presentence 
Report deficiencies." J&. (Emphasis added). The Assistant 
District Attorney was told to send law enforcement officers to the 
prison to see Appellant; and then report to the Court whether he 
had cooperated. If it was reported that Clark did not cooperate, 
the Trial Court indicated that it would impose consecutive 
sentences. I&- at 263. A third sentencing hearing was set for 
March 22, 1993. 
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At the Third Sentencing Hearing, the Trial Court again began 
by claiming that Clark had provided AP&P with little information 
to prepare a report. The Court then shifted its focus, however, 
and stated that it was inclined to run the sentences consecutively 
unless Clark cooperated with law enforcement and gave them a full 
disclosure concerning other crimes in which Clark may have been 
involved, and identified co-conspirators. (Emphasis added.) Post-
Trial Motions, Transcript of Proceedings, ("Hra. 3"). at 265. 
Counsel for Clark pointed out that at the conclusion of the trial, 
the Court had suggested that it would accept the recommendation in 
the Presentence Report prepared for Judge Hanson's case, and would 
likely impose a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence 
imposed by Judge Hanson. Hra. 3 at 266. 
Counsel also pointed out that at the second hearing, there 
had been a turn of events, in which the Trial Court wanted Clark 
to cooperate law enforcement officials rather than be interviewed 
by AP&P for additional background information, j£l. at 267. 
Counsel for Appellant acknowledged that the Trial Court had 
an interest in certain background information, but forcing Clark 
to become involved in this investigation, through possibly self-
incriminating statements to federal investigators, was a violation 
of his constitutional rights. X&. at 272. The Court stated that 
it recognized Clark had a right to remain silent, and that he not 
incriminate himself without a grant of immunity from law 
enforcement agencies. The Court also acknowledged that no such 
immunity had been offered to Clark; and that the Court could not 
6 
legitimately force Clark to do anything. However, the Court then 
stated, "it is clear that he didn't give any useful information to 
AP Sc P. When he appeared before me, the prosecutor made the 
request that he cooperate with the law enforcement officers. 
That's the point in which the Court made it clear that seemed to 
be appropriate." XdU at 273. 
Thereafter, the Trial Court imposed a consecutive sentence 
because, as the Court stated, "there is no indication in Judge 
Hanson's report, as well as mine, that there was any cooperation 
with law enforcement officers to explain these as well as other 
crimes." Id. at 277. (Emphasis added). The Trial Court stated 
that given the lack of cooperation, the Court was justified in 
sentencing Clark to 1 to 15 year sentences on both counts. The 
Trial Court ran the sentences consecutive to each other, plus 
consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Hanson in another 
case. Id. at 278. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court violated Clark's constitutional rights when 
it imposed consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences, based 
upon the fact that Clark would not divulge information to federal 
law enforcement officials relating to the crimes with which he was 
charged, or other similar crimes that occurred in Utah. Due 
process applies in post-trial, as well as, trial proceedings. 
Clark raised his Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination during the sentencing phase of his trial once it was 
revealed that the Trial Court no longer wanted Clark to provide 
7 
I 
background information to Adult Parole and Probation, but instead, 
desired Clark to cooperate with federal investigating authorities 
from the United States Postal Services and the United States 
Secret Service. 
Clark's refusal to cooperate was not an attempt to protect 
any "former partners" in crime, thereby "preserving his ability to 
resume criminal activities upon release", but was to protect his 
right against self incrimination as it related to any future 
federal charges against him. The Trial Court abused its 
discretion when it considered Clark's refusal to cooperate with 
federal agents as a deciding factor in determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences. The sentence imposed by the Trial 
Court violated Clark's Fifth Amendment rights under the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution 
for the State of Utah, thereby making it an unconstitutional and 
illegal sentence. Consequently, the Trial Court should have 
granted Clark's Motion to Correct Sentence, which was timely 
filed, because the trial court "may correct an illegal sentence, 
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CLAIM ON APPEAL 
BECAUSE RULE 22(e) EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT AN ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE MAY BE CORRECTED AT ANY TIME. 
A, The Express Language Qf Rule 22(e) Permits Appellant 
to Raise Hip Igpue on Appeal t 
Appellant has the right to appeal the District Court's Final 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence. In fact, 
Rule 22(e) specifically states that "The court may correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at 
any time." Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Since the District 
Court placed an unconstitutional demand upon Appellant as a 
condition to receiving a less harsh sentence, Clark was permitted 
(and probably required) to seek to have his sentence corrected by 
the trial court. There is no time limit provided in this rule. 
Likewise, there is no applicable procedural bar or any statute of 
limitation which has not been met by the Appellant. Indeed, the 
State has provided absolutely no authority for its position that 
the procedure followed by Appellant, in his attempt to correct the 
illegal sentence, is improper. Thus, since the illegal and 
unconstitutional sentence was handed down to Appellant; and his 
Motion to Correct the Sentence has been denied, this appeal fits 
squarely within both the time frame and the procedure for an 
Appeal from a Final Order of the district court refusing to 
correct that illegal sentence. 
Appellant has therefore brought this appeal to the proper 
forum. In fact, when this very court had occasion to address a 
9 
similar issue, the Utah Court of Appeals explained that "...the 
trial court is the proper forum to first challenge the imposition 
of allegedly illegal sentences." State v. Brooks, 230 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 33, 37 (1994). Similarly, this Court has recognized that the 
trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction in order to correct 
an illegally imposed sentence. State v. Galleaos. 84 P.2d 586, 
591 (Utah App. 1993). 
The instant appeal is not a situation involving principles of 
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or even stare decisis. The 
issue raised in the instant appeal has never been presented, 
argued and ruled upon by the Court of Appeals; and this appeal is 
not merely an attempt to reinstate the direct appeal which that 
was abandoned. The State's characterization is therefore unfair 
when it compares this situation with one wherein an appellant 
voluntarily or deliberately abandoned his direct appeal; and then, 
later regretted his decision, so another appeal was filed in place 
of the old one. 
Furthermore, Appellant has been completely candid with this 
court about the nature of this appeal. The Docketing Statement 
filed with this court clearly stated that there was a prior 
related appeal but that "it was eventually dismissed for lack of 
prosecution because prior counsel for Appellant failed to file 
Appellant's Brief." The related appeal was also identified in the 
Docketing Statement by the date on which it was filed, case 
number, and even the reason for its dismissal. 
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Ironically, the State filed a Motion to Strike Appellant's 
Opening Brief asserting the very same arguments more than six (6) 
months ago; and this Court denied that Motion. While suggesting 
that Appellant is raising the very same argument after it has 
already been properly disposed of, the State is rearguing its 
claim that the prior related Appeal bars Appellant appealing the 
Third District Court's Final Order on is Motion to Correct 
Sentence. That same request was denied by this Court less than 
six months ago. 
Appellant is able to reference specific case and statutory 
authority in support of Appellant's position in the instant 
appeal, while the State is engaged in an effort to mischaracterize 
the nature of this appeal; yet it cites absolutely no support or 
precedent for its position. The trial court was indeed the 
appropriate forum for Appellant to first challenge an illegally 
imposed sentence. State v. Brooks. 230 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. The 
express language of Rule 22(e) provides that Appellant's Motion 
was timely; Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e); and this 
rule has been interpreted as granting continuing jurisdiction to 
the trial court for purposes of correcting an illegal sentence. 
State v. Galleaos, 849 P.2d at 592. Clearly, this Court should 
address the merits of Appellant's appeal, as the State has offered 
absolutely no logical reason to do otherwise. 
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B . The Cases Cited bv The State Either Do Not ADPIV Or 
Are Easily Distinguishable. 
The cases cited by the State completely ignore the fact that 
appellant has raised a valid issue on appeal. The instant appeal 
is obviously derived from the Final Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Correct Sentencing. All of the State's cases presuppose 
that appellant is trying to either resuscitate an appeal that was 
already dismissed; or to re-litigate an issue which has previously 
been addressed and ruled upon by this Court. Obviously, the 
issues are similar, because they are all generated from the same 
illegal sentencing procedure followed by the trial court. 
However, the fact that the legal issues are similar and the facts 
are interrelated, in no way means that Appellant is barred from 
his present appeal. 
The State's argument asserts that because the direct appeal 
was dismissed, no other appeals can ever be taken by Appellant, 
even if it is based upon separate causes of action. There can 
certainly be no question that the instant appeal was taken from a 
Final Order; and the State has provided no case law or statutory 
authority which demonstrates that the instant appeal should be 
barred as improper. 
The State would also have this Court believe that because 
Appellant did not repeatedly state that this appeal is an appeal 
of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence and 
then limit his citations to the record of the Hearing on that 
Motion; that it is somehow a different and deceitful "end run 
12 
around (the law)." The Conclusions of Law in the District Court's 
Final Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence states 
little more than that the court stands by its earlier sentencing, 
based upon that Court's same prior reasoning (refusal to cooperate 
with law enforcement). All of these issues are addressed by 
Appellant in his brief; and it is misleading for the State to 
suggest that Appellant's efforts to correct the sentence is in 
some way less than candid. 
This court should consider Appellant's claims on appeal 
because they were properly raised and addressed in the Brief and 
squarely within appropriated appellate procedure. In fact, this 
Court's holdings in cases such as Galleaos and Brooks, supra, 
suggest that this Court prefers the filing of a Motion to Correct 
Illegal Sentence with the district court prior to an attempt to 
raise the same issue first by a direct appeal. This is similar to 
the preferred procedure for addressing an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. 
Contrary to the State's argument, Appellant is not taking 
some roundabout approach to arriving at the same end. In fact, it 
is quite the opposite, because this appeal is the most direct way 
to correct an illegal sentence. By contrast, completely ignoring 
the language of Brooks, the State proposes that Appellant be 
required to file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in order to 
address his rights pursuant to Rule 22(e). Through this 
procedure, the State would have Appellant present his argument to 
someone other than the Sentencing Court, have a different judge 
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review the prior comments at sentencing, determine whether such 
comments and opinions were appropriate, and then decide whether to 
grant Extraordinary Relief based upon this process. An appeal 
would then follow this lengthy and resource consuming process. 
The approach suggested by Brooks. that "the trial court is 
the proper forum to first challenge the imposition of allegedly 
illegal sentences..." pursuant to Rule 22(e) is clearly superior 
to the alternative advocated by the State. Appellant has 
appropriately raised the sentencing issue before this Court in 
accordance with applicable procedure. This Court should therefore 
address the merits and substance of this issues raised by 
Appellant in the instant appeal. 
11 . THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED CLARK TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BASED UPON 
CLARK'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATING 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES. 
A. The State 's Claim That The Sentencing Court Was Only 
Concerned With Obtaining "Background Information" Is 
Completely Inconsistent With The Record. 
Appellant's refusal to give information to investigating 
authorities was not done in any effort to be uncooperative, or to 
protect some illegitimate criminal cohorts. Instead Appellant's 
silence was based entirely upon his constitutional rights against 
compelled testimony against himself. Appellant's rights are the 
same whether he "takes the Fifth," pursuant to Article I Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, or the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The State either misperceives or 
misrepresents the true facts of this case; and the impression the 
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State gives regarding Appellant's willingness to provide so-called 
"background information" is extremely misleading. At the 
conclusion of Appellant's trial, but prior to Sentencing, Judge 
Kenneth Rigtrup directed the Adult Probation and Parole Department 
".•.that they are to send [Judge Rigtrup] a copy of the 
Presentence Report going to Judge Hanson; and update it if they 
have any additional information to give." (Transcript at 234). 
This was done both to expedite Appellant's sentencing process and 
because Judge Rigtrup had scheduled some time off. i£i. , at 233. 
When Adult Probation and Parole interviewed Appellant for his 
sentencing scheduled before Judge Timothy Hanson, it had already 
been discussed, and Judge Hanson had fully anticipated that 
Appellant would not make any significant disclosures to Adult 
Probation and Parole in light of his up-coming trial before Judge 
Rigtrup. 
The so-called lack of "background information" was therefore 
not treated as any significant problem by Judge Hanson when 
Appellant was sentenced. Likewise, upon a careful review of the 
record, it is obvious that Judge Rigtrup was also not seriously 
concerned about any additional "background information" necessary 
to accomplish an appropriate sentence of the Appellant. 
Specifically, when the parties convened for the Second, as well 
as, the Third Sentencing Hearings conducted on February 22 and 
March 22, 1993 respectively, Judge Rigtrup made himself very clear 
in that he would impose consecutive sentences "unless Appellant 
cooperated with law enforcement." III. , at 260. 
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At the Second Sentencing Hearing, the following exchange took 
place: 
Mr. Ybarra: I would think that, for law 
enforcement purposes, we'd want the detective to 
interview the Defendant. 
Is that what the Defendant is proposing that 
we'd be able to do? I can pass that on to them, Miss 
Byrne? 
Mr. Booker: Our inclination was to have Adult 
Probation and Parole --
Mr. Ybarra: I don't think --
Mr.Booker: -- here --
Mr. Ybarra: That would be terribly useful to 
the State; although.... 
Mr. Booker: Well, your Honor suggested that he 
needed more information on the Defendant's background 
and just finding out who --
The Court: Just cooperate. The only thing you 
get points for is cooperation, really, with law 
enforcement. You are giving me the Andrew Valdez 
speech. I heard it at great length, that somehow one 
should not cooperate with law enforcement, and I don't 
buy that..." 1^. 
The Court concluded its address to Mr. Clark by stating: 
"So you can decide whether you want to be out there 
consecutive or concurrently. I think the information 
would be very helpful to law enforcement and 
important enough that I could consider the less severe 
sentence. It is not really the Presentence Report 
deficiencies." III., at 261. 
One can certainly not read the above exchange and 
legitimately conclude that Judge Rigtrup was somehow genuinely 
concerned about some general "background information" or other 
deficiencies in the Presentence Report submitted to Judge Hanson, 
when he candidly stated, on the record, and in open Court, that he 
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was not concerned with any "background information" or 
"deficiencies" in the Presentence Report. The State's claims to 
the contrary are therefore entirely inconsistent with the 
objective evidence before this Court. 
B . Appellant's Objection To Being Compelled To Give 
Testimony And Assist Federal Investigators Was Clearly 
And Specifically Raised. 
At the Final Sentencing Hearing Appellant's counsel clearly 
informed Judge Rigtrup that an Inspector from the Unites States 
Postal Service, Gene Griffin, and an agent from United States 
Secret Services, Roger Rodak were among the persons whom the 
County Attorneys Office desired to have interview Mr. Clark. Id.. 
at pp. 267-269. These federal investigators were clearly not 
persons whose interest was in providing "background information" 
to the trial court. 
There were numerous, specific references by Appellant's 
counsel that Mr. Clark's fears were related to "subsequent 
prosecution and possible conviction in Federal Court." id. , at 
268. Furthermore, his Counsel specifically raised Appellant's 
rights against self-incrimination as they related to "any future 
federal charges under the Utah Constitution and the Federal 
Constitution." Id., at 268-269. 
The plain and simple truth is that no one from Adult 
Probation and Parole ever even attempted to obtain any additional 
information from Appellant. In fact, absolutely no legitimate 
effort was made to over come the so-called "deficiencies;" and an 
objective review of the facts reveal that neither the State nor 
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the District Court were interested in any "background 
information." In deed, Adult Probation and Parole never even 
attempted to contact Appellant or his counsel. The record in this 
matter plainly contradicts the State's present claim that the 
Court and the State were merely seeking background information 
through purely innocent means. One cannot argue in good faith 
that requiring a defendant to be interviewed by a federal Postal 
Inspector and Secret Service Agent, without a grant of immunity, 
about criminal activity, does not expose that defendant to 
subsequent prosecution in federal court. Under the circumstances, 
one also cannot legitimately claim that these federal agents were 
innocently engaged in an effort to assist Judge Rigtrup in 
overcoming deficiencies in the Presentence Report. 
The State repeatedly refers to Appellant as uncooperative merely 
because he asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. The 
State argues that the Appellant has some social obligation to 
divulge this information as a means of helping out law 
enforcement; and in its Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's 
Motion to Correct Sentence, the State even referred to these 
rights as, the recitation of a "magical incantation." The State 
fails to recognize however that there is HQ compelling social 
obligation when the Appellant's silence is protected by the 
privilege against self-incrimination, as it was in the instant 
case. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S. Ct. 
1358, 1363 (1980). 
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Therefore, it is not Appellant's background, history, and 
rehabilitative needs that the sentencing court took into account 
when it gave the most harsh sentence available to the Appellant. 
Instead, the court observed the Appellant's failure to incriminate 
himself during a continuing federal investigation by the United 
States Postal Service and Secret Service, then decided that his 
reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination was 
unacceptable. This caused the court to rely upon groundless 
inferences when it sentenced Appellant to two additional, 
consecutive terms of imprisonment. There is not question that the 
above sentencing procedure was unfair, unconstitutional and 
illegal. 
Therefore, because no officer of the District Court was ever 
sent to interview Appellant (after it was made clear to him the 
importance of cooperating with AP&P), Appellant was never given 
any opportunity to cooperate with the proper authorities in a 
meaningful way. Tr., at 257. Instead, only federal 
investigators, with an eye towards prosecution in federal court, 
were sent to interview the Appellant. This clearly was not 
something which was designed to serve any legitimate judicial 
function as an aid in arriving at an appropriate sentence for the 
Appellant. Instead, this was an inappropriate means of attempting 
to coerce Appellant into giving up his rights against self-
incrimination. 
Had these federal agents offered immunity in a forthright and 
plain manner, then Appellant could perhaps have been termed 
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uncooperative for his refusal to participate in an interview with 
them. However, as immunity was never offered, the danger of 
subsequent federal prosecution, based upon information obtained 
from that very interview, was never displaced; and Appellant was 
well within his right to remain silent and not make potentially 
incriminating statements to these federal investigators. See. 
United States v. Manduiano. 425 U.S. 564, 575, (1976); Ullmann v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956). 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it sentenced Clark 
to a second, and then a third consecutive sentence because Clark 
was not willing to cooperate with law enforcement, despite the 
fact that absolutely no grant of immunity was ever offered. 
Therefore, this Court should find that the Trial Court did, in 
fact, abuse its discretion, and correct the illegal and 
unconstitutional sentence imposed by the Trial Court in this case. 
The absolute most that the Trial Court could justify under the 
circumstances was a single consecutive term for the crimes Clark 
had been convicted of. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument in this case as it may 
assist this Court in the disposition of the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $H dav.of Dec, 
Robert L. Booker 
Attorney for Appellant 
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